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INTRODUCTION

During a meeting of the General Assembly of the Organization
of American States, on February 24, 1982, President Ronald Reagan responded to the economic crisis destabilizing Latin America
by proposing ". . .[an] economic program that integrates trade, aid
and investment-a program that represents a long term commitment to the countries of the Caribbean and Central
America .. . ."I This proposal, commonly called the Caribbean
Basin Initiative (CBI), was passed by Congress and signed into law
by President Reagan on August 5, 1983, as the Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovery Act.2 Congress described the program as
"[consisting] of integrated, mutually reinforcing measures in the
fields of trade, investment, and financial assistance to address both
emergency problems and long range economic development." 3
The Reagan Administration's CBI proposal in 1982 attempted
to address a socio-economic crisis in Latin America which at that
time had been compared to the situation in post-World War II Europe.4 In 1981, estimates of the amount of financial assistance that
would be necessary for the region through the end of the 1980s ran
as high as twenty billion dollars. 5 Some have referred to the CBI as
a "Basin Marshall Plan," analogizing it to then Secretary of State
John Marshall's plan established to assist Europe in its post war
recovery.'
1. Remarks on the Caribbean Basin Initiative to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, PuB. PAPERS 210 (Feb. 24, 1982).
2. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 384 (1983)
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2701 (1983)) [hereinafter CBI].
3. H.R. REP. No. 266, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS, 635, 644 [hereinafter CBI REPORT].
4. Street, A "Basin' Marshall Plan, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1982, at A27, col. 1.
5. Dickey, CaribbeanInitiative Reported Stalled in Mire of Troubles, Wash. Post, Oct.
11, 1981, at A22, col. L
6. "The Marshall Plan was a comprehensive program for reconstruction and development, in which private efforts and public assistance were effectively combined to repair the
ravages of war, cope with inflation and payments problems, and promote Western Europe's
long range development. Similar circumstances prevail in Central America, on a smaller
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Like post-war Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean were
suffering from inflation, unemployment, balance of payment
problems and liquidity problems at the time President Reagan
proposed the CBI. The region found itself in the midst of a socioeconomic and political revolution, including guerilla warfare in El
Salvador and Nicaragua. Not only were these two countries in turmoil, but they threatened their bordering neighbors' political, social, and economic stability as well. More important, from an economic perspective, the CBI nations were spending a large part of
their gross national product on oil than in previous years, fueling
an ever increasing and spiraling inflation rate.7 For example, in
1984, the Dominican Republic experienced an inflation rate of
twenty-seven percent; in 1985, Costa Rica and Jamaica experienced inflation rates of fifteen percent and 23.1 percent respectively; and in 1986, El Salvador experienced an inflation rate of
thirty-two percent.'
On August 5, 1987, Congressman Samuel Gibbons of Florida
introduced the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1987
("CBI II") in the House of Representatives." The purpose of this
proposed amendment was "to improve the operation of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act."' 0 During the hearings in the
scale and at an earlier stage of development." Street, supra note 4.
7. See CBI REPORT, supra note 3, at 644. Accompanying the passage of the CBI, the
following considerations were highlighted:
The Caribbean Basin countries have been seriously affected by the escalating
cost of imported oil and declining prices for their major exports (e.g., sugar, coffee, bauxite). This has exacerbated their deep-rooted structural problems and
caused serious inflation, high unemployment, declining gross domestic product
growth, enormous balance-of-payments deficits, and a pressing liquidity crisis.
This economic crisis threatens political and social stability throughout the region
and creates conditions which Cuba and others seek to exploit through .terrorism
and subversion.
Id.
8. See generally BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND NOTE, EL SALVADOR, NOVEMBER 1987 (1987); BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE BACKGROUND NOTE, JAMAICA, January 1987 (1987);
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, UNITED STATE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BACKGROUND

NOTE, COSTA

RICA, May 1986 (1986); WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1987 at 565 (M. Hoflman ed.

1987) [hereinafter WORLD ALMANAC].
9. H.R. 3101, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
10. Id. A similar bill, S. 1594, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), was introduced by Sen.
Robert Graham (D-Fla.) in August 1987. As of the end of the 100th Congress in October,
1988, CBI II had not passed.
The bill was reintroduced in the 101st Congress, as H.R. 1233, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989) (The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1989) with certain changes. An
identical bill was introduced in the Senate as S. 504, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). For a
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House of Representatives, then United States Trade Representative Clayton Yeuter expressed the Reagan Administration's conditional support of the legislation.1 1 The Administration's reservations regarding CBI II included opposition to "provisions that
would give special preferences to apparel and textile imports from
distressed Eastern Caribbean nations and ones that called for raising U.S. sugar import quotas."1 2 Notwithstanding the Reagan Administration's measured response to the bill, Yeuter stated that
"[a] fortified CBI would contribute importantly to greater prosperity and economic stability in the Caribbean Basin."' 3
An inquiry into the effectiveness of the CBI and the proposed
CBI II amendment must address the following concerns: 1)
whether the CBI generated positive and productive economic revitalization for the Caribbean Basin; 2) whether the Reagan Administration's motive for the proposal possessed strong foreign policy
objectives and national security undertones that adversely affected
the results of the CBI; and 3) if not, what further political, economic and/or social measures, either in a unilateral or multilateral
approach, can improve the program?
In addressing these concerns, the scope of this comment is
limited to a study of the history and effectiveness of the CBI, a
description of its existing provisions, its strengths and its weaknesses, the fundamental changes CBI II envisions, the degree to
which CBI II will deal with the problems which were not addressed
or which were not solved by implementation of the CBI, and finally some suggestions for solving these problems.
In order to understand the CBI and its economic impact on
the Caribbean and Central American region, one must first understand the political, economic, and social intricacies and shared
characteristics of the nations in the region. To accurately assess
the success or failure of the program, the CBI must be compared
to other trade programs including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP), Most Favored Nation (MFN), and Tariff Schedules of the
United States items 807 and Super 807.14
discussion of the specific differences between the two House bills, see infra note 167.
11. Whitefield, Backers Hope to Revive CBI Bill, Miami Herald, Oct. 17, 1988, at 11
(Bus. Monday).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. For a brief discussion of these trade programs, see infra notes 88-121 and accompa-
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THE CARIBBEAN BASIN

The Caribbean nations are located in a geographic area of
strategic importance to the United States. 5 The United States has
shown a greater interest in promoting economic development in
the region over the last decade. Due to the proximity of the Caribbean nations, the United States has considered both the economic
and political climate of the area a matter of national security.",
The United States' concern was especially evident during President Reagan's administration. Although the Carter administration
approached the area's problems by balancing national interests
and values, the Reagan administration demonstrated its concern
by not wavering "in its singleminded policy of anticommunism. '"17
President Reagan defended the Caribbean Basin Initiative by stating that "new Cubas will arise from the ruins of today's conflicts.
We will face more totalitarian regimes tied militarily to the Soviet
Union, more regimes exporting subversion, more regimes so incompetent yet so totalitarian .

...

"18

The Caribbean region, including the nations on the rim of the
Caribbean, is comprised of twenty independent nations and nine
territories. 19 Each nation has unique characteristics in almost every
area, including linguistics, culture, history, and political diversity.
Undoubtedly, establishing an economic program that promotes the
building and maintenance of these nations' infrastructures is a
very complex task.
nying text.
15. See generally Zorn & Mayerson, The Caribbean Basin Initiative: A Windfall for
the Private Sector, 14 LAW. AM. 523, 543 (1984).
16. Whether these are legitimate concerns is beyond the scope of this comment. However, it should be noted that scholars have been critical of the Reagan administration's purported long-term commitment to the countries of the Caribbean and Central America. Two
leading commentators, Zorn and Mayerson, have stated that:
[tihe CBI has two primary purposes: first, to assist private enterprise, particularly United States businesses, by making the Caribbean region open to and safe
for foreign and domestic private investment; and, second, to ensure the economic and military security of the United States by preserving its predominance
in the Western Hemisphere.
Id. at 524.
17. Pastor, Sinking in the CaribbeanBasin, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 1038, 1042 (1981).
18. Id. at 1042, 1043.
19. WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 8, at 545.
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CBI

The CBI was the response of the United States government to
a July, 1981 meeting held in the Bahamas between the United
States, Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela." ° The meeting's agenda
was to develop and sponsor a program for multinational assistance
to the region. The original version of the bill proposed to Congress
by the President contained four major provisions: 1) duty free
treatment for products from the CBI nations; 2) an investment tax
credit of up to ten percent of fixed asset investment by United
States entrepreneurs in the region; 3) increased foreign aid; and 4)
private sector training, technical assistance and other similar benefits.2 The bill, as passed by Congress and signed by President Reagan, contains only one of the original proposals: the duty free
treatment of certain goods from CBI designated nations.2 2
The CBI exempts certain products from duty free entry into
the United States.23 These exempted products are: textile and apparel goods, footwear, handbags, luggage, flat goods, work gloves
and leather wearing apparel, tuna, petroleum, or petroleum derived
products, watches and watch parts, sugar and molasses. Most of
the beneficiary countries under the CBI have a substantial market
in the production of some of these items (e.g., the Dominican Republic-textile and apparel goods; the Eastern Caribbean- petroleum or petroleum derived products; Honduras-handbags and
luggage; the Dominican Republic, Panama and Guatemala-sugar
and molasses).2 " Under the CBI, sugar exports of these countries
which were not eligible for duty free import under Section 504(c)
of the Trade Act of 1974,2" remain ineligible for such treatment.
20. See Clasen, The CaribbeanBasin Economic Recovery Act and its Implication for
Foreign Private Investment, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 715, 718 (1984).
21. President's Message to Congress on the Caribbean Basin Initiative, 18 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 323 (Mar. 22, 1982). The bill was introduced in the House as H.R. 5900
and was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, 128 CONG. REC. 991 (1982). The bill was introduced in the Senate as S. 2237 and
referred to the Committee on Finance and the Foreign Relations Committee, 128 CONG. REC.
2422 (1982). H.R. 5900 was reported to the entire House on July 16, 1982, with amendments. H.R. REP. No. 665, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
22. See CBI, supra note 2; 19 U.S.C. § 2701 (1983).
23. See 19 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (1983) (articles to which duty free treatment does not
apply).
24. See generally supra note 8.
25. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1974) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §
2464(c) (1983)). The Trade Act of 1974 established GSP. For further discussion, see infra
notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
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However, quotas are established which allowed limited entry of
these products into the United States.2 6 These rules are intended
to assure that duty free imports from CBI beneficiary countries
will not interfere with the U.S. price support system for sugar
mandated by Congress.
A.

Classification Criteria

To obtain classification as a CBI beneficiary country," the bill
established the following specific criteria which must be met: 1) a
non-Communist government; 2) no expropriation of any property
belonging to either the United States or any United States nationals; 3) cooperation with the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency; 4) adequate protection of patents, copyright and trademark rights; 5) recognition of collective bargaining rights of workers; and 6) establishment of self-help measures.2 s The statute
grants the President the power to proclaim a nation a beneficiary
country.2 9 In addition, it outlines specific factors which the President may consider when designating a nation as a beneficiary"
(some commentators have identified this provision as a leading example of the overt political motivation behind the CBI).3 1 These
26. Supra note 25, § 2464(d)(2).
27. CBI, supra note 2, subsec. (b)(1)-(7).
Section (b) of the CBI named the following nations as potential beneficiary countries:
Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica,
Nicaragua, Panama, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad
and Tobago, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Saint Christopher-Nevis,
Turks and Caicos Islands and the British Virgin Islands.
Since adoption of the CBI, Aruba has been named a potential beneficiary nation. See
infra note 42.
28. CBI, supra note 2, subsecs. (b),(c).
29. See CBI, supra note 2.
30. Id. subsec. (c).
31. Clasen, supra note 20. In the section of the article dealing with designation of beneficiary nations, the author illustrates how the President can use these provisions to advance
his political or foreign policy objectives in a manner not contemplated by the Act.
Specifically, the author identifies four reasons for asserting the manipulative implications of this provision: first, the mandatory conditions and discretionary considerations are
broadly worded and thus subject to interpretation; second, the commitments that the President may require as a condition to designation; third, the fact that the mandatory conditions and discretionary considerations appear to be designed less to encourage economic
growth and development than to foster a favorable environment for U.S. investment; and
last, by authorizing the President to terminate the beneficiary designation of any country
upon sixty days prior notice, the Act creates the same sense of insecurity which its proponents sought to terminate. Id. at 726-28.
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factors include the economic policies of the beneficiary host nations such as: the strength of the country's assurances to the
United States that it will provide equitable and reasonable access
to its markets and basic commodity resources; the commitment of
the country to the principles of the GATT;32 the degree to which
the country uses export subsidies or imposes export performance
and local content requirements which distort international trade;
degree to which the trade policies of the country, as they relate to
other countries, contribute to the revitalization of the regions; and
the willingness of the country to undertake self-help measures
which promote its economic development.
32. GATT, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, is the result of a major conference held in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1947 to negotiate reciprocal multilateral tariff reductions and to negotiate the Charter for an International Trade Organization ("ITO"). The
GATT was to be presented to participating signatory nations in conjunction with the ITO
Charter. The Geneva Conference of 1947 was unable to complete the latter document and a
Convention was scheduled for Havana, Cuba, in 1948 for that purpose.
During the negotiations for the ITO Charter, the U.S. negotiators realized that Congress would not approve the Charter. In an effort to implement the provisions of GATT
without the ITO Charter, the signatory nations adopted the Protocol of Provisional Application. This agreement implemented GATT as an international legal norm. There are several
differences between the Protocol and GATT. The most significant of these differences relates to Part Two of GATT which includes the code of conduct and the measures of national
treatment, anti-dumping, countervailing duty, measures of subsidies, state trading and
quantitative restrictions.
The Protocol states that those clauses in GATT would be implemented only to the
extent not inconsistent with prior legislation. The ITO was never adopted and thus GATT
is still provisionally applied subject to these clauses. See Jackson, GATT and Recent International Trade Problems, 11 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 1, 9 (1987). However, with the passing
of time and the implementation of legislation of member countries, the Protocol has become
an increasingly less important limitation on GATT.
GATT was updated in 1957 and is currently the central body of substantive international law regarding the trade policies of the ninety full and one provisional member. Additionally, thirty-one other nations apply GATT to their trade relations on a de facto basis. In
1966, Part IV dealing with trade with developing nations was added to the agreement.
A significant development in the evolution of GATT law has been the growth of special
agreements negotiated at a formal GATT round. These agreements address emerging trade
problems or elaborate upon rules in the original GATT. Although the General Agreements
failed to establish an organizational structure to administer its provisions, a permanent Secretariat headed by a Director-General has been established. A Council of Representatives
was established to address issues that arise between sessions. See A. Swan, The Regulation
of International Business and Economic Relations (March 1989) (unpublished manuscript
available at the offices of University of Miami Inter-American Law Review); see also ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES, GATT PLUS-A PROPOSAL FOR TRADE REFORM WITH THE
TEXT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT (1975).
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B.

Rule-of-Origin Standard

The first major provision of the CBI, which affects products
not wholly manufactured in a beneficiary country, provides that all
products from those countries designated as beneficiaries under
Section 212 of the Act are entitled to duty free entry into the
United States, provided they meet the requirements of the rule-oforigin standard set out in Section 213(a) of the Act.13 The provision also requires that the product be imported directly from a
beneficiary country into the United States Custom Territory. 4 Not
less than thirty-five percent of the appraised value of the goods
must be composed of materials produced or processed in one or
more beneficiary countries, including Puerto Rico and the U.S.
Virgin Islands. 5 The act provides that United States materials
may count for up to fifteen percent of the appraised value to be
counted in reaching the thirty-five percent minimum.36
C.

Ordinary and Necessary Business Expense Allowance

The second major provision allows the U.S. taxpayer to deduct
ordinary and necessary business expenses incurred while attending
business or investment conventions located in designated beneficiary countries which have entered into special information exchange tax treaties with the United States. 7 The Act thus provides
the U.S. government with means for acquiring information regarding banking activities by U.S. taxpayers in offshore banking centers such as Panama, the Bahamas, the Turks and Caicos, and the
Cayman Islands.

IV.

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CBI

Currently, twenty-two of the eligible nations in the Caribbean
Region have been designated "beneficiary nations" by the President of the United States. 38 Six nations, Anguilla, the Cayman Is33. CBI, supra note 2, § 213(a)(1).
34. United States Customs Territory is defined as "the States, the District of Columbia
and Puerto Rico." 19 U.S.C. § 1641 (1983).
35. CBI, supra note 2, § 212(c).
36. Id.
37. Id. § 222. Section 222 of the CBI Act provides for this new section amending subsection (h) of Section 274 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to business expenses including attendance at conventions, etc.).
38. See generally U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM., ANNUAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF THE CAR-
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lands, Guyana, Nicaragua, Suriname, and the Turks and Caicos Islands remain undesignated eligible countries. 9 The Bahamas
gained designation in March 1985 and, after severing its ties with
the Netherlands Antilles, Aruba became a designated eligible
country.4 0
Despite the preferential treatment offered to the beneficiary
countries under the Act, there has been a consistent decline in the
value of U.S. imports from beneficiary countries."' By contrast, the
level of U.S. exports to these same countries has remained
steady."' According to the United States International Trade
Commission:
In 1986 for the first time in a number of years, the United
States had a small surplus with the Caribbean countries collectively, making the Basin one of the few areas of the world with
which no U.S. trade deficit was recorded. This was the result of
a significant decline in U.S. imports from the Caribbean basin,
from $9.0 billion in 1983 to $6.2 billion in 1986, while U.S. exports to the area remained approximately the same, fluctuating
around $6.0 billion.43
United States imports from the CBI countries reached an all time
high in 1983, the year of its enactment. 4 Between 1983 and 1986,
imports from the CBI countries declined a total of thirty-one percent.45 In 1986 such imports represented only 1.7 percent of the
total U.S. trade market,4 6 while U.S. exports to the Caribbean area
represented three percent of the entire U.S. export market.47
IBBEAN BASIN ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT ON U.S. INDUSTRIES AND CONSUMERS, THIRD REPORT

1987 at ix (September 1988) [hereinafter THIRD ANNUAL REPORT]. For a list of the eligible
nations, see supra note 27. Currently, Guyana and Suriname are being considered for designation. See also House Trade Panel's Gibbons Says He Hopes CBI Expansion Legislation
Will Pass in 1988, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 464 (Mar. 30, 1988); Administration
Generally Supports CBI II, Further Action May be Possible This Year, Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA)No. 37, at 1273 (Sept. 21, 1988).
39. See THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 38.
40. Id. In April, 1986, Aruba became a beneficiary country under the CBI retroactive to
January 1, 1986, the date on which it severed ties to the Netherlands Antilles, thus becoming an autonomous member of the Netherlands.
41. Id. at 1-1.
42. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM., ANNUAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIN
ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT ON U.S. INDUSTRIES AND CONSUMERS, SECOND REPORT 1986 at 1
(Sept. 1987) [hereinafter SECOND ANNUAL REPORT].
43. Id.
44. Id. at 6.

45. Id. at 8.
46. Id. at 1.
47. Id.
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The decline in U.S. imports has been due in part to the decline in the value of imports from oil refining countries.48 Overall,
total imports from non-oil refining activity actually rose twentyfive percent for the years 1983 through 1986."1 The major non-oil
imports from the Caribbean basin include coffee, fresh bananas,
shellfish, sugar, derived oil products, analgesics, beef and veal,
electronic and electronic articles, and a wide range of clothing
apparel."
By comparison, U.S. trade with Central American and Caribbean nondesignated countries dropped dramatically.
Nondesignated countries include the Cayman Islands, Guyana,
Nicaragua, Suriname, and the Turks and Caicos Islands." For example, in 1983, imports from Nicaragua reached $99 million. 2 By
1986, this level had declined to almost zero, primarily due to the
tense political climate between the United States and Nicaragua,
including the trade embargo imposed by President Reagan.53 Overall, U.S. imports from nondesignated countries in the Caribbean
area dropped to less54 than two percent of total U.S. imports from
the Caribbean area.

An examination of the results of the CBI in different designated countries reveals some interesting facts. Between 1982 and
1986, the percentage of customs-valued U.S. imports from the socalled Caribbean Basin nations increased by ninety-one percent,
for Central Caribbean nations by eighty-three percent, and for
Eastern Caribbean nations by seventy-eight percent. 5 By contrast,
the level of customs-valued imports decreased for the oil refining
countries by fifty-four percent."
48. Id. Oil refining nations of the CBI are: Aruba, the Bahamas, Netherlands Antilles,
and Trinidad and Tobago. See infra note 56.
49. SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 3.
50. Id. at 5.
51. Id. at 3.
52. Id.

53. In March, 1987, the United States embargoed virtually all trade with Nicaragua.
See Proclamation No. 5617, 52 Fed. Reg. 7,265 (1987).

54.

SECOND ANNUAL REPORT,

supra note 42, at 3.

55. Id. at 5.
56. Id. For purposes of this comment, the authors have adopted the country classifications used by the United States International Trade Commission report. The CBI nations
are divided into four groups: Central America, Eastern Caribbean, Central Caribbean and
Oil Refining Nations. The countries are then classified as follows: Central America-Belize,
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama; Eastern Caribbean-Anguilla, Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Christopher-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines; Central Caribbean-British Virgin Islands, Haiti, the Dominican
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In 1983, four CBI designated beneficiary oil refining nations
were responsible for sixty-percent of all U.S. imports from the
twenty-four eligible nations." A steep decline in 1984, 1985 and
1986 in imports from these oil refining nations was responsible for
the overall decline in U.S. imports from the area." While total imports from non-oil refining countries increased twenty-five percent
between 1983 through 1986, total imports from the area during the
same period, declined by thirty-one percent.5
In absolute terms, total U.S. imports for consumption from
the Caribbean nations increased seventy-eight percent from 1983
to 1986.60 Among Eastern Caribbean nations, only imports from
Barbados accounted for more than one percent of the total. The
rest of the Eastern Caribbean nations accounted for anywhere
from 0.05 percent by Grenada to 0.37 percent by St. ChristopherNevis-Anguilla.6 1 Clearly, these Eastern Caribbean nations have
benefited the least from the CBI.2
Of the CBI designated beneficiary countries that accounted for
more than ten percent of the total United States imports from the
region, the three nations that benefited the most and their respective percentage increases in exports to the United States are: Costa
Rica, 151 percent; Jamaica, 118 percent; Dominican Republic, 105
percent. 3 The Dominican Republic and Costa Rica continue to be
the leading beneficiaries of the program. In 1984 their share of total U.S. imports from CBI nations was fifty percent." By 1987,
however, this figure had dropped to thirty-seven percent. 5 The
Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, and Jamaica are the top three
nations in the number of investment projects registered in 1987.6
St. Lucia had the largest number of investment projects among the
smaller nations. 7 Excluding the oil refining countries, three naRepublican and Jamaica; Oil refining-Aruba, the Bahamas, Netherlands Antilles, and
Trinidad and Tobago.
57. Id. at 5.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 3.
60. Id. at 5.
61. Id.
62. For further discussion on the problems with Eastern Caribbean nations see infra
notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
63. THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 38, at 1.5.
64. Id. at vi.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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tions encountered the largest percentage decrease in the total U.S.
imports for consumption during the period between 1983 to 1987:
the Bahamas (seventy-seven percent); Barbados (seventy percent);
and Trinidad and Tobago (thirty-nine percent). 8
According to the International Trade Commission's Third Annual Report, the Central Caribbean Region's share of U.S. imports
from CBI has continued to rise and accounted for thirty-two percent of the total in 1987.69 Rapid growth in United States imports
from the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Haiti was responsible
for this increase. However, the Eastern Caribbean Region's share
declined to 2.4 percent of the total in 1987, down from a peak of
4.4 percent in 1985.70
A noticeable increase in trade from the Caribbean region has
resulted from the manufacture and exportation of textiles and apparel in Caribbean countries. 71 In 1983 textiles and apparel accounted for 4.5 percent of total U.S. imports from the region. 2 In
1987, this figure had risen to nineteen percent. 7 This emerging economic revitalization in the area is not attributable to the CBI.
These items, textiles and apparel, are expressly excluded from the
provisions of the program.74
V.

CRITICISMS OF

CBI

The strongest criticisms leveled against the CBI have focused
on the Reagan administration's emphasis on foreign policy objectives which harmed the economic strength of the program. The
criticisms are based on the fact that Cuba is not an eligible designated country;" that Nicaragua has not been designated a benefi77
ciary; 76 that El Salvador receives a disproportional amount of aid;
68. Id. at 1-2.
69. Id. at 1-3.
70. Id. The report attributes the loss in share of the Eastern Caribbean nations to consistent and rapid falling imports from Barbados, the largest country in the group, as reflected by the closing of a number of electronic assembly plants.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 19 U.S.C § 2702(b) (1983).
75. Mexico, one of the original participants of the "Nassau Four," refused to attend a
meeting of the foreign ministers from the CBI nations because Cuba would not be designated a beneficiary country. Clasen, supra note 20, at 718.
76. For a list of eligible nations see supra note 27.
77. Dickey, supra note 5.

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:3

and that the United States requires CBI nations to accommodate
its economic and political interests.7"
The critics profess that the CBI reflects the administration's
interest in military security, political loyalty, and advantages for
U.S. firms, rather than U.S. concerns for the region's long-term development."9 One critic stated:
The Central American and Caribbean policy of the United
States has seldom grown out of the needs or interests of those
countries; it has always been a response to the larger strategic
concerns of the United States. .... The CBI attempts to achieve
three interrelated ends: first, it promotes expanded economic
linkages between the United States and countries in the region,
increasing their dependency on the United States; second, it
proffers economic rewards to those Caribbean Basin countries
that have supported the United States policies, insuring their
continuing support; and third, it isolates from economic benefits
those countries that are considered threats to United States security, weakening their economies and, the administration
hopes, their governments."'
The argument regarding the program's disproportional economic aid carries the most weight. For example, of the $350 million
in supplemental economic aid that was passed in conjunction with
the CBI, El Salvador received more than one third.8 ' Specifically,
$243 million or sixty-nine percent of the supplemental aid to CBI
nations, was destined for Central America in general, and $128 million, a startling thirty-seven percent, for El Salvador alone. 2 Ironically, Honduras and Haiti, two of the poorest nations in Central
America 3 and the Caribbean," received substantially less supplemental economic aid than El Salvador. 5 At the time, El Salvador
was in the midst of a civil war between the rebel forces supported
by Nicaragua and Cuba and the ruling government supported by
78. Zorn & Mayerson, supra note 15; see also Clasen, supra note 20, at 727.
79. Lowenthal, Misplaced Emphasis, 47 FOREIGN POL'Y 114, 115 (1982).
80. Zorin & Mayerson, supra note 15, at 545-46.
81, Dickey, supra note 5.
82. Id. See also Zorn & Mayerson, supra note 15, at 547-48.
83. WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 8, at 567-68.
84. Id. Per capita income of the seven Central American countries are as follows: Belize-1,000 (1984), Costa Rica-$2,238 (1981), El Salvador-$854 (1984), Guatemala-$1,085 (1984), Honduras-$590 (1982), Nicaragua-$804 (1980), Panama-1,116
(1978). Id. at 551, 562, 567, 575, 577, 599 & 602.
85. Zorn & Mayerson, supra note 15, at 548.
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the United States. 6
VI.

COMPARISON OF

CBI

TO OTHER TRADE PROGRAMS

According to the House Report on the passage of the CBI, in
1981, twenty-seven percent of the exports from the region entered
the United States duty free under the Generalized System of Preferences or under permanent MFN duty free treatment. 7
Although the scope of this comment does not permit a thorough analysis of all existing U.S. trade programs, a brief description of these programs is required for a comprehensive comparison
with CBI.
A.

Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)

The GSP is a unilateral grant of duty free customs treatment
for less developed countries.8 The original ten year program was

contained in the Trade Act of 197489 and was extended and renewed for an additional eight and one-half year period by the Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984.9o The eligible
articles under the GSP are textile based apparel; import sensitive
steel, glass and electronic products; footwear; leather wearing apparel; baggage, handbags, flat goods; work gloves; and watches. 1
Under the GSP, a country is automatically disqualified for
specific product categories if its total exports to the United States
exceed $57 million in a calendar year, or if they account for fifty
percent of total United States imports of the product.2 Certain
countries are designated as least developed and do not have these
limits placed upon them. 3 Beginning in 1987, the President may
86. Who's Who in the Region, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 24, 1986, at 17.
87. CBI REPORT, supra note 3, at 644. For a brief discussion of MFN, see infra notes

108-10 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of GSP, see A. Swan, supra note 32,
at 121.
88. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2495 (1974). Under the GSP, the eligible countries are designated
in four groups: 1) independent beneficiary developing countries; 2) non-independent beneficiary countries and territories; 3) associations of countries treated as one; and 4) least developed beneficiary developing countries. None of the industrialized nations or country members of the European Community are eligible.
89. 19 U.S.C. § 2101 (1974).
90. 19 U.S.C. § 2464 (1984).
91. 19 U.S.C. § 2463 (a)-(c) (1984).
92. See also supra note 90.
93. Id. subsecs. (a), (c).
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waive the limits entirely or reduce the limit to $25 million or
twenty-five percent of total imports. 4 In deciding on these limits,
the President may consider country competitiveness, the country's
treatment of U.S. exports of goods and services and U.S. property
rights. 5
1. GSP Country-of-Origin Requirements
There are three requirements that must be met to obtain the
benefits of the GSP under the country-of-origin rule: 1) the product must be imported from the beneficiary country-of-origin; 2)
thirty-five percent of the import value must be derived from a
combination of Beneficiary Developing Countries ("BDC") origin
materials plus the direct costs of manufacturing performed in the
BDC; and 3) the BDC must have substantially transformed the
foreign components into new articles of commerce."
The GSP scheme contains a graduation program under which
a country is permanently disqualified from the program if its annual per capita GNP exceeds $8,500. 97 Some of the most developed
countries in Asia, countries that have enjoyed the greatest benefits
from the GSP program, have reached this plane. By Executive
Proclamation, the President declared that Korea, Singapore and
Taiwan, among others, graduated from the program effective January 1, 1989.98
2.

Designation

The manner in which a nation is designated as a beneficiary
under the GSP and CBI programs is essentially the same. 9 The
President has the authority, subject to certain limitations, to desig94. Supra note 90, § 2464 (c)(2)-(3).
95. Id.
96. 19 U.S.C. § 2463(b) (1984).
97. 19 U.S.C. § 2464(f) (1984). This figure along with the percentages for specific product disqualifications are all indexed to inflation, using 1984 as the base year.
98. Proclamation No. 5805, 53 Fed. Reg. 15,785 (1988) states that effective January 1,
1989, Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan will graduate from the
GSP "[blecause these countries are sufficiently advanced in economic development and
their recent improvements in trade competitiveness that continued preferential treatment
under the GSP is not warranted." In addition, Presidential Memorandum dated May 19,
1987, 52 Fed. Reg. 19,271 (1988) declared that Bahrain, Bermuda, Brunei Darussalem, and
Nauru will also graduate from the program effective July 1, 1988.
99. For information regarding classification criteria, see supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
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nate a country as beneficiary. 10 0 However, in the GSP, the President may designate not only the country as a BDC, but also the
articles for which the preference is to be granted.10 1 Under the
CBI, once a country is designated as a beneficiary under the program, all of the articles which are eligible for duty free treatment
under the Act may enter tax free.10 2
3.

GSP Compared to CBI

There are significant differences between the CBI and GSP.
One is the determination of the rule-of-origin requirement, specifically, the thirty-five1 03percent minimum allowed value added in the
beneficiary country.
Whereas the CBI allows for a maximum of fifteen percent to
be accounted for from U.S. Virgins Islands or Puerto Rican manufacture or origin, T0 GSP specifically requires that the thirty-five
percent be from BDC manufacture or origin exclusively.1 0 5 Another
difference is that the CBI abrogates the competitive need test established under GSP.10 6 Lastly, certain classifications of products
entry through the CBI which are not permitted under
are allowed
10 7
GSP
B. Most Favored Nation (MFN)
The Most Favored Nation (MFN) concept embodies the principle of non-discrimination. It outlaws most non-tariff barriers to
trade and subjects tariff barriers to negotiated reductions through
concepts of reciprocity and national treatment.1 08
100. See supra note 27.
101. See supra note 2.
102. 19 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (1984) states that any article which is the growth, product or
manufacture of a beneficiary country is eligible for duty free treatment. However, 19 U.S.C.
§ 2703(b) (1984) exempts from duty free entry the following goods: textile and apparel,
footwear, handbags, luggage, fiat goods, work gloves, leather wearing apparel, tuna, petroleum, watches, and watch parts.
103. CBI, supra note 2, § 212(c).
104. 19 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(1) (1984).
105. See supra note 96.
106. For a complete description of the competitive need test, see 19 U.S.C. § 2464(c)
(1984).
107. See 19 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (1984) (exempting from duty free treatment items specifically enumerated). These products include electronics, steel, glass, and baseball equipment.
Id.
108. See A. Swan, supra note 32, at 30.
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Countries confer upon one another favored nation treatment
status under bilateral and multilateral agreements reached under
GATT.' In broadest terms, MFN ties each contracting party's
treatment of the other's commerce to the other's treatment of its
trade. 110 As one commentator explained, "under conditional MFN,
if country A grants a concession to country B in exchange for a
given concession, A extends the concession to another country, C,
only if C grants a corresponding concession. Under unconditional
MFN, C obtains the concession without granting one of its own."' 11
C. 807 and Super 807
Under Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS) item
807.00, importers are exempt from paying duties on the U.S. content of items assembled from U.S.-fabricated components." 2 In
1986, President Reagan announced a "special access program," referred to as 807-A or "Super 807," which provides incentives to
beneficiaries for exporting garments." 3 Under Super 807, countries
in the region have been invited to enter into guaranteed access
levels (GAL) through bilateral agreements with the United States
which would allow for exports of qualifying textile and apparel
products.""
Super 807 allows the beneficiary nations to increase their level
of exports to the United States significantly faster than non-CBI
beneficiaries. ' 5 In 1987, this program resulted in $79 million in
109. Charney, InternationalAgreements and the Development of Customary Law, 61
WASH. L. REv. 971, 980 (1986) states "Generalized principles relating to most favored nation
treatment, prohibitions on indirect barriers to imports, subsidies and countervailing duties,
and dumping are found within the GATT and are implemented through a widespread network of international agreements among large number of states."
110. For an example of the application of this concept in a multilateral setting, see
Whitney u. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888), cited in A. Swan, supra note 32, at 31.
111. Cline, "Reciprocity": A New Approach to World Trade Policy?, 2 INST. FOR INT'L
EcON. 16, n.21 (1982). MFN clauses generally take one of two forms: conditional or unconditional. Conditional clauses are employed by parties to restrict MFN treatment to existing
concessions. To secure MFN treatment as to new concessions, the grantee must reciprocate
with compensating concessions of its own. Through the use of unconditional clauses, the
grantor confers MFN status as to both existing and future concessions. Lansing & Rose, The
Granting and Suspension of Most Favored Nation Status for Non-Market Economy
States: Policy and Consequences, 25 HARV. INT'L L.J. 329 (1984).
112. THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 38, at 1-9.
113. Id.
114. Id. These GAL quotas are separate from the Multifiber Arrangement applicable to
other textile and apparel products. Id.
115. Id.
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textile and apparel imports from the three countries, Haiti, the
Dominican Republic, and Jamaica, that have entered into bilateral
agreements.11 6

VII. EcONOMic EFFECTIVENESS
Most of the CBI beneficiary nations in the Caribbean Basin
are agricultural economies, historically relying on one or two basic
cash crops. For example, the Dominican Republic's economy is
strongly dependent on its sugar exports as a source of foreign
reserves.1 17 As enacted, the CBI sets quotas on the amount of sugar
that may enter the United States duty free. 1" 8 The Dominican Republic, as well as Guatemala and Panama, are limited by these
quota requirements on the export of their major cash producing
crop to the United States." 9 Clearly, this restriction is not in line
with an economic policy that attempts to revitalize and strengthen
the local economies through a system of trade liberalization. Instead, it evinces an economic program that can not effectively compete with the United States sugar industry. These quotas and restrictions provide further evidence that the CBI was not a well
thought out program and could not possibly encourage economic
growth in the Caribbean area.
Congressman Gibbons, commenting during the hearings,
stated that the CBI did not "go far enough in terms of liberalizing
trade. We must say we gave with one hand but took away with a
bushel basket in another."' 0 On the sugar trade issue, the Congressman stated that "two-thirds of the Caribbean sugar sales to
the United States were lost after CBI became law."' 1 Another proponent of the amendments proposed under CBI II, Rep. Bill
Frenzel (R-Minn.), referred to the CBI as "a skeleton," adding,
"[W]e're about to hang some meat on that skeleton."''
However, the CBI is not the only U.S. trade program which
116. Id.
117. See generally supra note 8.
118. 19 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (1984). The quantity of sugar, syrups and molasses which may
enter each year free of duty is limited to metric tons: Dominican Republic 780,000, Guatemala 210,000 and Panama 160,000.
119. Id.
120. Legislation to Expand Trade Preferencesfor CBI Beneficiaries Introduced in the
House, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 1006 (Aug. 12, 1987).
121. Id.
122. Id.
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curtails the entry of sugar products from these countries. Under
the GSP, and now under CBI II, the custom duty on sugar exports
to the United States from the Dominican Republic, Panama, and
Guatemala is levied when these countries exceed their quotas by
surpassing the competitive need limitations set up to protect domestic industry.1 2 3
John Compton, Prime Minister of the small Eastern Caribbean island of St. Lucia and Jamaican Prime Minister Edward
Seaga voiced strong criticism against the CBI. 2 4 They have
pleaded for changes as a result of the negligible impact the CBI
has had on the region." 5
VIII.

PROPOSED CHANGES UNDER

CBI II

In an effort to improve, extend, and broaden the operation of
the CBI, Congressman Gibbons' proposed bill addresses eight topics. These changes address the major reasons for the initial program's failure:
The version introduced in the House contains two controversial
provisions added by Gibbons that he conceded are sure to generate opposition from powerful organizations and labor groups.
One provision would restore the sugar quotas of Caribbean nations serving U.S. markets to the original levels that prevailed
before the CBI took effect. The other would allow unlimited
duty-free treatment of clothing and other articles manufactured
from materials that are 100 percent U.S.-made.' 6
The proposed modifications to CBI deal with: 1) the percentage of
the appraised value added to the goods that are attributable to the
123. Supra note 25. See also CBI Trade and Investment Benefits Failing to Spur
Broad Economic Growth, GAO Reports, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 1031 (July 2,
1988). Specifically, the General Accounting Office (GAO) addressed the fact that while total
exports to the United States have increased for the CBI designated beneficiaries, net foreign
exchange earnings have not increased accordingly. As a result, the problems of meeting debt
service requirements continue. Additionally, dropping commodity prices and cuts in U.S.
sugar quotas aggravate the problem as well. The shortage and crisis of hard foreign currency
has not been alleviated. In terms of increased employment, the GAO reported that since
most countries only attracted low-cost investments, the growth "cannot be termed secure or
long-lasting because an investor can move to another country with minimal disruption or
loss." Id.
124. Caribbean Nations Welcome New CBI Bill, But Optimism is Tempered With
Caution, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 1007 (Aug. 12, 1987).
125. Id.
126. Legislation to Expand Trade Preferences for CBI Beneficiaries Introduced in the
House, supra note 120, at 1006.
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United States; 2) duty free entry into the United States of certain
types of products excluded under CBI; 3) injury determination reporting requirements of the Act; 4) extension of the duty free
treatment program until the year 2007; 5) special tariff treatment
for beneficiary country products; 6) the accumulation involving
beneficiary country products under the countervailing duty and
anti-dumping laws; 7) production of ethyl alcohol in beneficiary
countries; and 8) sugar imports from beneficiary countries. 2 7
A.

Rule-of-Origin

Under the CBI rule-of-origin requirements, at least thirty-five
percent of the appraised value of the goods at the time they enter
U.S. customs territory must be either value added or products of a
beneficiary country. 2 ' If part of the cost or value of the article
consists of materials produced in U.S. customs territory, an
amount not to exceed fifteen percent may be applied towards determining the thirty-five percent rule-of-origin test.12 CBI II proposes a distinction for purposes of this section between Eastern
Caribbean beneficiary countries 30 and non-Eastern Caribbean nations. As to the former, the fifteen percent which may be attributable to U.S. origin will be increased to twenty-five percent; as to the
latter, the fifteen percent will remain intact.' This permits "U.S.made imports to count for approximately seventy percent of the
127. See supra note 4.
128. See supra note 35.
129. Id.
130. For a listing of the different groups of countries, see supra note 56.
131. See supra note 4, at 2. The proposed amendment to Section 3 reads as follows:
Section 213(a)(1) is amended by striking out the last sentence and inserting the
following: If the cost or value of materials produced in the customs territory of
the United States (other than the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico) is included
with respect to an article to which this paragraph applies, an amount not to
exceed:
(i) 25 percent, if the article is the product of an East Caribbean beneficiary country: or (ii) 15 percent, if the article is the product of a beneficiary country other than an East Caribbean beneficiary country; of the
appraised value of the article at the time it is entered that is attributed to
such United States cost or value may be applied toward determining the
percentage referred to in subparagraph (B).
For purposes of the preceding sentence, each of the following will be considered
as an East Caribbean nation during any period when designated as a beneficiary
country: Antigua and Barbuda, Anguilla, Aruba, the British Virgin Islands, the
Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Netherlands-Antilles, St.
Christopher-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and the Turks
and Caicos Islands.
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requirement."1 32
The rationale for increasing the allowable percentage from
Eastern Caribbean nations is to increase assembly operations in
these islands. By granting this concession to the Eastern Caribbean
nations, CBI II would lessen the apparent discrimination against
these island states. CBI had no major impact on these countries
because they lacked an economic infrastructure that could directly
benefit from the limited advantages of the CBI. 1 33 Although the
other nations in the program could at least count on a few areas of
the CBI program from which they could potentially benefit, the
majority of these Eastern Caribbean nations base their economies
on tourism and service oriented industries, such as banking and
corporate services. For example, the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, and the Turks and Caicos are major offshore banking centers and greatly benefit from secrecy laws relating to their financial
industries. These nations could benefit from the CBI only if they
exchange treaties with the United
entered into tax information
34
States government.
B. Product Eligibility
The second major proposed change, and perhaps the most
controversial, is to Section 213(b) of the CBI, which originally prohibited duty free entry of certain products (including textiles, apparels, petroleum and petroleum derived products, tuna, watches,
and watch parts). Under CBI II, this section would be amended to
allow entry of these products.' 3 5 However, the products must meet
specific criteria for eligibility. The applicable section of CBI II
states that articles will receive duty free treatment if the United
States International Trade Commission determines that:
(A) the articles within that category either (i) are not produced"
in the United States, or (ii) are not produced in the United
States in quantities sufficient to meet the domestic demand for
the product; and (B) no directly competitive articles are pro132. Legislation to Expand Trade Preferencesfor CBI Beneficiaries Introduced in the
House, supra note 120.
133. THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 38, at 3-8. See also Caribbean Basin Representatives Generally Endorse CBI II Legislation as Hearings Start, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 14, at 1557 (Dec. 16, 1987).
134. THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 38.
135. For the text of this proposal, see infra app. A.
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duced in the United States."3 6
The industry which would stand to benefit most from this provision is the garment segment, which "has suddenly become the
star of the manufacturing sector in several Caribbean nations. The
value of regional apparel exports has soared from $90 million in
1985 to $1.073 billion by 1987."' 3 In early 1988, at the Caribbean
Fashion Carnival held in Montego Bay, Jamaica, William Houston,
then Chief U.S. Textile Negotiator, stated that "apparel exports
from CBI countries accounted for almost nine percent of total U.S.
apparel imports, or triple the volume of U.S. imports from the entire European Community. Growth in the 1Caribbean
is continuing
38
at a rate of thirty-four percent annually.'
C.

Injury Determination

Another provision calls for a separate injury determination in
countervailing duty and anti-dumping cases."9 Currently, to determine injury to the U.S. domestic industry, imports from all countries exporting a certain product are cumulated.4 The new bill
would allow imports from countries to be treated separately, except to the extent of imports of like products that are the product
of one or more other designated countries. 4 ' Overall, this would
reduce the possibility that any one import from a designated country might have a sufficient impact on the U.S. domestic markets.
Therefore, the ITC would be less likely to find a material injury to
136. Supra note 3, at § 4 (amending § 213A(c)(1) of CBI). See also Legislation to Expand Trade Preferencesfor CBI Beneficiaries Introduced in the House, supra note 120. To
obtain duty free treatment applicant must file a petition with the International Trade
Commission.
137. Imports of Caribbean Garments Soar in Wake of CBI, Further Access Sought,
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 625 (Apr. 27, 1988).
138. Id.
139. CBI, supra note 2. Section 8 of CBI II states:
the volume and effect of imports from a country designated as a beneficiary
country under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act may only be cumulatively assessed with respect to the imports of like products that are the product of one or more other countries designated as beneficiary countries.
Id.
Countervailing duties are assessed in response to subsidies with respect to manufacture,
production, or exportation of a class or kind of merchandise imported, or sold for importation into the United States. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1980). Anti-dumping duties are assessed on
a class or kind of foreign merchandise which is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United
States at less than its fair market value. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1980).
140. See CBI, supra note 2.
141. See supra note 131.
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the U.S. domestic industry and levy a duty on the import.
D. Changes in Sugar Quotas,
Another significant change would affect sugar quotas. The proposed bill would change the aggregate quantity of sugar that may
enter the United States to the amount that was allocated to that
specific country for import into the United States during the period beginning September 26, 1983, and ending September 30,
1984.142

Former U.S. Trade Representative Clayton Yeuter testified
that he opposes this provision "even though [the Reagan Administration] wants to find a way to increase the region's access to the
United States market. ' 143 Yeuter gave two reasons for his opposition. First, "preferential reallocation of the sugar quota to CBI
countries . . . would be inconsistent with U.S. obligations under
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. ' 144 Second, by making the sugar program a budget item,1 46 the provision would be in
14
conflict with the 1985 Food Security Act. 1
IX.

OBSERVATIONS

The primary issue outstanding is whether or not the CBI II
will result in any significant changes to the economic situation in
Central America and the Caribbean. Although CBI II provides for
some significant changes to the original program, several important
problems remain unresolved. In order to establish a truly comprehensive economic program for the area, several additional factors
must be addressed such as: the lack of centralized administration
in CBI countries; the absence of infrastructural support systems in
the same; their failure to address the tourism and service industry;
and finally, a heightened degree of guarantee or security for foreign
investment.
First, a major reason for the CBI countries' failure to con142. THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 38, at 3-8. According to this report, the provision would increase the quotas from a current level of 350,690 short tons to 1,166,286 short
tons.
143. See Administration Generally Supports CBI II, Further Action May be Possible
This Year, supra note 38.
144. Id. See supra note 32 for an explanation of GATT.
145. 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 1281-1393 (1985).
146. See generally supra note 38.
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cretely resolve any of their problems with the CBI is their lack of
an effective centralized mechanism to mobilize and enact the provisions of the program. An international or regional organization
patterned after GATT's Secretariat and Council of Representatives 4 7 is essential to facilitate the multilateralism required for an
efficient program. Without it, the potential benefits for the region
remain idle.
In 1988, the Caribbean Basin Business Promotion Council
("Council"), a federal advisory committee established by former
Secretary of Commerce, C. William Verity, held its first meeting in
Washington, D.C.14' The Council consists of twenty-eight executives from U.S. companies and senior government officials from
agencies involved with the CBI. The Council's objectives are to
promote CBI business in their local business communities and industry sectors by serving as advisors for the affected industry sectors and by disseminating information about CBI investment opportunities throughout their business networks.1 49 Section 107 of
the CBI legislation directed the Secretary of State to study the fea50
sibility of establishing a Caribbean Trade Institute in Harlem.
Ostensibly, this study was to incorporate an assessment of the extent to which such an institute "could facilitate cooperation between public and private interests, encourage greater cultural exchange, and promote job opportunities related to U.S.-Caribbean
trade." 5 '
However, the urgency of the socio-economic crisis in the region
mandates a greater commitment by the United States in the form
of an administrative agency, the so-called "Caribbean Basin Economic Community" (CBEC), comprised of eligible CBI member
nations or subregional groups. This would allow for multilateral
representation, as opposed to U.S. unilateral "commissions," and
would effectuate the humanistic international nature of the program. This proposed agency should be established to organize, implement, and advise both the United States government and the
beneficiaries in the implementation of the program. It could be established either under the auspices of the United Nations or under
147. See A. Swan, supra note 32.
148. Caribbean Basin Business Promotion Council Holds Inaugural Meeting, 5 CBI
Bus. BULL., MAY 1988, at 1.
149. Id.
150. See CBI, supra note 2, § 107.
151. CBI REPORT, supra note 3, at 665.
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the Organization of American States.15 2 "[A] comprehensive program for reconstruction and development, in which private efforts
and public assistance [can be] effectively combined to repair the
ravages of war, cope with inflation and payment problems and promote [the Caribbean's and Central America's] long range development"' 5 can be best accomplished if a multilateral administrative
agency, such as the proposed CBEC, is implemented.
A second and equally important reason for the relative failure
of the CAI is the absence of an infrastructure support system, thus
precluding the beneficiary nations from taking advantage of the
program. An effective use of the program would require roads,
power supplies, communications systems, airports, sea ports, and
manufacturing facilities. The lack of these essential elements for
economic development is particularly visible in Eastern Caribbean
nations where inability to fulfill the country-of-origin requirements
prevails. Although the CBI II would lower the contribution threshold from thirty-five percent to fifteen percent for the Eastern Caribbean nations,1 54 and to twenty-five percent for non-Eastern Caribbean nations, 155 given their present technological shortcomings
the ability of these nations to even meet this reduced level remains
questionable.
A third and final deficiency in the CBI II is its failure to address the service industry, a prime revenue generating sectors of
local economies. The majority of the CBI nations rely on tourism
as a major source of hard currency reserves and as a foundation for
their economic development.' 6 A thorough program would address
the need to promote and create incentives for a stronger tourist
influx. Development studies including investigation and construc152. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1967, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 (entered in force Jan. 1, 1958).
In comparison, it should be noted that the European Community began as a trade organization among its member nations. By the year 1992, there will be no customs barriers
throughout the European Economic Community (EEC) and its approximately 300 million
inhabitants will form one of the strongest, most cohesive economic powers among the free
market economies of the world. This European rebuilding is largely attributable to the success of the Marshall Plan in the post-World War II years. Id.
153. Street, supra note 4.
154. See CBI, supra note 2.
155. Id.
156. For example, Antigua and Barbuda had 195,000 tourists visit in 1984, St. Christopher-Nevis had 40,000 visitors in 1985, St. Lucia had 98,000 visitors in 1981 and tourist
receipts of US$34 million. St. Vincent and the Grenadines had tourist receipts of US$18
million in 1983 and Grenada had tourist receipts of US$17 million in 1984. See generally
THE WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 8.
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tion of tourist resorts should be a major provision. In addition,
U.S. nationals should be encouraged by favorable tax programs
and treatment to infuse capital into the region. In support of CBI
II, representatives of the Caribbean Basin countries stated their
reservation that "continued exclusion of tourism from the program
will reduce its benefit to the region and consideration should be
given to measures to aid tourism during Congressional debate on
1' 57
the bill.
Another proposal is a program which would guarantee direct
investment in the region through a "Caribbean Basin Investment
Guarantee Fund" (CBIGF). This program would be funded with a
one-time start up infusion. Thereafter, funding would continue by
a minimally assessed premium on foreign investments. For example, a premium fee to be determined based on the total investment
value and an assessment of the risks involved would insure the face
amount of capital invested by an entrepreneur against political
and sovereign risk in the foreign jurisdiction.
The CBIGF would operate in the same manner as the Foreign
Credit Insurance Association (FCIA) created in 1965 at the suggestion of the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Eximbank).' 58 FCIA is an unincorporated underwriting association of
insurance companies which issues short term and long term multibuyer commercial credit policies. The Eximbank enters into
agency and reinsurance agreements with the FCIA whereby Eximbank reimburses FCIA for any excess of net losses over net premiums over the course of one year. FCIA insures for its own commercial credit risk and for Eximbank's political and sovereign
risk.'5 9 This program, established as a result of 12 U.S.C. § 635,
furthered the congressional intent of insuring and guaranteeing
U.S. exports to improve the U.S. balance of payments. This same
system could be implemented for the purpose of reducing the perceived risks in capital investments in the Caribbean region.
One final reason for the CBI's failure is the constant pressure
from U.S. businesses, special interest groups, and organized labor
for the introduction of bills and the initiation of trade actions com157. CaribbeanBasin Representatives Generally Endorse CBI II Legislation as Hearings Start, supra note 133.
158. For the general structure of Eximbank's authority to guarantee and insure foreign
exports, see 12 U.S.C. § 635 (1965).
159. Id.
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monly referred to as "protectionist.' 6 0 A recent example was Congress' passage of the Textile and Trade Act of 1988161 which President Reagan vetoed calling it "protectionism at its worst" and
citing its potentially "disastrous effects on the U.S. economy.""2' '
Although the Super 807 program was designed to benefit the textile industry in the CBI beneficiary countries, the garment manufacturers in the Caribbean are lobbying for unrestricted access to
the U.S. market for their exports.1 6 3 They argue that "overall
[their] supply of textile and apparel to the United States is quite
small. . ." and that "[t]he Caribbean area is not a threat to the
U.S. textile and apparel industry."' 6 4
X.

CONCLUSION

The CBI was the beginning of preferential treatment by the
United States for trade and investments in a specific region. Although the U.S. intent in adopting this regionalistic approach was
predominantly to further U.S. national security goals, if the program is to benefit the Caribbean, it cannot be railroaded by protectionist legislation.
The data corresponding to U.S. imports from the region
demonstrate that the CBI program was unsuccessful in providing
preferential access to the United States market for exports from
Caribbean nations. Perhaps, if the original version of CBI proposed by President Reagan had survived in Congress with the four
original provisions intact, the CBI nations might have truly bene160. See Ray, ChangingPatterns of Protectionism:The Fall in Tariffs and the Rise in
Non-tariff Barriers,8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 285 (1987).
In discussing the consequences of trade policy conflicts, the author states:
by the mid-1970's protectionist interests had become strong enough to cripple
legislation intended to assist developing countries in their efforts to expand exports of manufactured goods to the United States and other industrial nations.
This trend continues into the 1980's as protectionist interests continue to gain
strength. The issue is no longer whether protectionist special interest groups are
sufficiently powerful to undermine the effectiveness of trade liberalizing legislation but rather whether or not there is any life left in the free trade movement.
Id. at 301.
161. S. 2662, H.R. 1154, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
162. SANDLER & TRAVIS TRADE ADVISORY SERVICES, INC., V TRADE & CUSTOMS UPDATE,
TEXTILE AND APPAREL TRADE ACT OF 1988 No. 8, at 7 (Oct. 1988).
163. Imports of Caribbean Garments Soar in Wake of CBI, Further Access Sought,
supra note 137.
164. Id.
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fited from the program.""
Congressman Gibbons' efforts in correcting the weaknesses of
the CBI should be applauded. The congressman's most beneficial
proposed changes include the eligibility of certain textile and apparel items for duty free treatment, the increase in the percentage
allowable of U.S. contents, and the establishment of sugar quotas
at the 1983 to 1984 level.' A truly effective Marshall Plan for the
Caribbean and Central America dictates an unwavering commitment from the United States. CBI II goes a long way towards this
goal. However, the United States can do more for its southern
neighbors. Congress should enact CBI II and reject all protectionist measures, which are, in the end, counterproductive to the spirit
of the CBI and the economic development of the region. '
GEMA M. PIq6N
RAOL JAVIER SANCHEZ

165. For a discussion of the consequences of trade policy conflicts, see Ray, supra note
160. In light of GSP and CBI, the author states:
[Olne recent study found that the GSP and CBI were sabotaged in this manner . . ..[I]fboth the GSP and the CBI began as genuine efforts to provide
developing countries with access to United States markets for key manufactured
exports, the fact that special interest groups were able to influence the final legislation to the point of making it irrelevant in both cases is a bit chilling. In
terms of our model, it suggests that our long-standing national commitment to
trade liberalization is close to being cancelled by the power of special interest
groups to thwart government efforts at international economic cooperation.
Id. at 310.
166. Id.
167. During the publication of this article, the House Ways and Means Committee reported to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union on H.R. 1233 known
as the "Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Expansion Act of 1989." There are several
differences between the reported bill and the bill as it was introduced in 1987 by Congressman gibbons and Senator Graham.
One important difference lies in rule-of-origin requirements. Whereas the 1987 bill proposed a distinction for purposes of rule-of-origin requirements between Eastern Caribbean
beneficiary countries and non-Eastern Caribbean nations, the 1989 bill eliminates such a
distinction. Indeed, the 1989 bill simply includes a section which states: "It is the sense of
the Congress that there should be undertaken special efforts in order to improve the ability
of the organization of Eastern Caribbean States countries and Belize to benefit from the
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act." H.R. 1233, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 105 (1989).
Another significant distinction is in duty free eligibility. The 1987 bill provided specific
criteria for duty free eligibility. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. Section 102 of
the 1989 bill now defines the term "qualifying fabric" as fabric formed and cut in the
United States and foreign fabric cut in the United States. Id. § 102. This section also mandates that the United States Trade Representative "shall establish with each beneficiary
country guaranteed access levels for textile products assembled in
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that country from qualifying fabrics." Id. The bill further authorizes the United States
Trade Representative to negotiate and conclude bilateral agreements with each country regarding guaranteed access levels. Textile products entering the United States pursuant to a
bilateral agreement would enter under duty free treatment and would be awarded duty free
treatment. To qualify for duty free treatment under these provisions, a textile product assembled in a beneficiary country from qualifying fabric and incorporating findings and trimmings from Foreign origin are eligible for guaranteed access and duty free treatment, if its
findings and trimmings do not exceed 25% of the cost of the components of the assembled
product. The 1989 bill provides that quota articles, textile or apparel articles imported into
the United States under either a specific limit or designated consultation levels established
in a bilateral textile agreement between the United States and a beneficiary country subsequent to the enactment of the bill, will be subject to a rate of duty equal to 50% of the
trade weighted average duty rate for the textile category under which the product is classified. The rate of duty of any footwear (other than leather footwear), handbag, luggage, flat
good, work glove or leather wearing apparel which is the product of a beneficiary country,
and was not a designated article would have a duty rate equal to 50% of the general rate of
duty under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.
The 1987 bill would have changed the aggregate quantity of sugar that may enter the
United States to the amount that was allocated to that specific country for import during
the period beginning September 26, 1983 and ending September 30, 1984. In contrast, under
the 1989 bill, the Secretary of Commerce would determine whether any country not fully
utilizing the base quota amount allocated to it each year and any amount determined to be
unused during such year shall be reallocated pro rata among the CBI countries receiving
base quota allocations for the year. The unused quota amount reallocated to any CBI country for any quarter year would be in addition to any reallocation made under the provisions
of the bill. The 1989 bill also specifies that the aggregate of the amounts of the base quota
allocations to the CBI countries for any year beginning after December 31, 1988, may not be
less than 371,449 metric tons, raw value. The bill states that the allocation made for any
year is suspended or terminated with respect to any country under any law authorizing such
action for purposes of dealing with a threat to national security or U.S. foreign policy, the
amount of suspended or terminated allocation shall be reallocated pro rata among the CBI
countries receiving allocations for that year.
Section 201 of the 1989 bill requires the administrator of the Agency for International
Development to establish an administrative program of scholarship assistance to enable students from eligible countries in the Caribbean and Central America to study in the United
States. Id. §§ 201.
Notably, the bill seeks to recognize tourism as a central element of economic development in the Caribbean Basin. The bill requires that a study of tourism be conducted in an
effort to increase tourism and related activities as a central part of the CBI program. As a
step toward the accomplishment of this goal, the 1989 bill establishes a pilot preclearance
program in which the United States Customs Service and the United States Immigration
and Naturalization Service would preclear individuals travelling to the United States from
CBI beneficiary contries. See supra note 156 and accompanying text for observations regarding the need for emphasis on tourism as an important economic sector in the region.
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APPENDIX A
Sec. 4. TREATMENT OF EXEMPT ARTICLES.
(a) IN GENERAL - The Caribbean Basin Initiative Recovery
Act is amended by inserting after section 213 the following new
section:
Sec. 213A. SPECIAL CATEGORY ARTICLES.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (c) and (d), the duty-free
treatment provided under this subtitle shall not apply to (1) textile and apparel articles which are subject to
textile agreements;
(2) footwear, handbags, luggage, flat goods, work
gloves, and leather wearing apparel not designated at the
time of the effective date of this title as eligible articles for
purpose of the generalized system of preferences under title V of the Trade Act of 1974;
(3) tuna, prepared or preserved in any manner, in airtight containers;
(4) petroleum, or any product derived from petroleum, provided for in part 10 of schedule 4 of the TSUS;
or
(5) watches and watch parts (including cases, bracelets, and straps), of whatever type including, but not limited to, mechanical, quartz digital or quartz analog, if such
watches or watch parts contain any material which is the
product of any country with respect to which TSUS column 2 rates of duty apply.
(b) The President shall establish such categories of the kinds
of articles referred to in each paragraphs (1) through (5) of subsection (a) as may be appropriate for purposes of administering each
of subsections (c) and (d).
(c)(1) The President shall provide duty-free treatment under
this subtitle to articles within any category established under subsection (b) if the United States International Trade Commission
determines that(A) the articles within that category either(i) are not produced in the United States, or
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(ii) are not produced in the United States in
quantities sufficient to meet the domestic demand
for the product; and
(B) no directly competitive articles are produced
in the United States.
(2) The President shall withdraw the duty-free treatment provided under paragraph (1) to articles within any
category if the Commission determines, after a petition for
such a determination is filed under paragraph (3), that the
category is no longer eligible for such treatment under
subparagraph (A) and (B) of paragraph (1).
(3) A request for a determination under paragraph (1)
or (2) may be made by any interested person by filing a
petition for the determination in such form as the Commission shall prescribe. The Commission shall make the
determination within 120 days after the date on which the
request is received. The petition for a determination under
paragraph (2) with respect to any category of articles may
not be filed sooner than the first anniversary of the date
on which the determination under paragraph (1) extending duty-free treatment to that category was made.
(d)(1) As used in this subsection, the term "duty-free quota"
means, with respect to each category of articles established under
subsection (b), and not excluded under paragraph (2), for each
beneficiary country(A) for calendar year 1988, a quantity equal to
103 percent of the base quantity for that category for
that country; and
(B) for each calendar year after 1988, a quantity
equal to 103 percent of the duty-free quota for the
immediately preceding calendar year for that category for that country. The base quantity of any category of articles established under subsection (B) for a
beneficiary country is the larger of (i) the quantity of articles in that category that
are a product of such country and were exported to
the United States during the most recent 12-month
period for which data is available; or
(ii) the quantity of articles in that category
that results from dividing -
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(I) the aggregate quantity of articles on
that category that are a product of all beneficiary countries and exported to the United
States during such 12-month period, by
(II) the number of beneficiary countries.
(2) For purposes of applying this subsection, articles
that are provided duty-free treatment under subsection (c)
or item 807.50 of the TSUS shall be disregarded.
(3) Subject to paragraph (4), the President shall provide duty-free treatment under this subsection to articles
of any beneficiary country that are entered during any calendar year after 1987 before the total quantity entered
during that year equals or exceeds the duty-free quota for
those articles that country for that year.
(4) The aggregate quantity of articles (A) in any category to which a duty-free quota
applies; and
(B) produced in all beneficiary countries; that
may be entered duty-free during any calendar year
after 1987 may not exceed an amount equal to 5 percent of the aggregate quantity of articles of that kind
that are entered during that year from all beneficiary
countries. If the 5 percent limitation set forth in the
preceding sentence is exceeded during any calendar
year, the President shall apply the excess, on an appropriate pro-rated basis, against the duty-free quotas for the following year for that category for all beneficiary countries.

